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AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH TO HOMELESSNESS: 




The purpose of this essay is to address discrimination against 
homeless people.  First of all, the theory of intersectionality will 
be explained and then applied as a method of analysis.  The 
complexity of defining homelessness will be tackled, focusing on 
the difficulties encountered when approaching this concept.  I will 
discuss notions of protected ground and immutability of personal 
characteristics, then outline an intersectional approach to 
homelessness.  Intersectional discrimination has not yet been 
applied by many courts and tribunals, but Canada has proven to 
be a vanguard in this area.  For this reason, Canadian case law 
has been chosen as the main example in this research.  I will 
explore stereotyping, prejudices, and social profiling in connection 
to homelessness.  In addition, I will touch on a peculiar aspect of 
homelessness that is concerned with the representation of 
different minority groups (such as race, mentally-ill and so on) 
within the homeless population.  Different laws and other legal 
sources concerned with criminalizing specific conducts against 
public order will be analyzed applying the outlined intersectional 
method.  Specifically this work will concentrate on quality of life 
regulations and anti-homeless regulations.  This paper will then 
establish that homelessness is a ground worthy of protection and 
then it will argue that the aforementioned kind of legislation 
results in direct and indirect discrimination.  In conclusion, the 
arguments in favor of including homelessness or social condition 
as a ground of discrimination will be laid out, with reference to 
Canadian, European, and international law sources.   
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I. AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH TO DISCRIMINATION 
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Afro-American activist and legal 
scholar, first introduced the concept of intersectional 
discrimination in the 80s.1  Crenshaw analyzed different cases, 
which dealt with discrimination of black women both in the labor 
market2 and in the area of domestic violence.3  She argued that a 
single-axis model of identity failed black women because their 
experience of discrimination was unique and therefore could not 
be captured by looking at gender and race separately.4  Criticizing 
the idea of identity politics, Crenshaw stressed the potential of a 
theory that could explain how different identities interact to 
create complex identities.5 
On one hand, of the main issues with conceiving 
discrimination law, as focused on one ground at the time, is that 
it neglects the role that power plays in relationships.6  On the 
other hand, early approaches to intersectionality as the one 
formulated by Crenshaw focused on the creation of new groups, 
such as black women.7  The aim of this kind of approach was “to 
reflect specific intersectional experiences,” but for this reason 
they were subject to the criticism of creating the possibility of an 
excessive proliferation of protected categories and subjects.8 
According to more recent intersectionality theories, which 
will be applied in this analysis, discrimination needs to be 
conceived as structural, i.e. “focus on relationships of power in 
order to determine who to protect and how.”9  The focus of this 
method of analysis is not on the personal characteristic shared by 
a group of individuals but on society’s reaction to the person.  The 
uniqueness of this kind of approach is that importance is given to 
the so-called “historical disadvantage,” which was experienced by 
 
 1.  See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).  
 2.  Id. at 141. 
 3.  Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping The Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, And Violence Against Women Of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991). 
 4.  Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 140. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  SANDRA FREDMAN, INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN EU GENDER 
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW 8 (Luxembourg: Publ’n Off., 2016). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
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a group of people.10  Furthermore, the advantage of this method 
is that it does not require that people identify themselves into 
“rigid compartments or categories” and that it acknowledges that 
discrimination is often “systemic, environmental and 
institutionalized.”11  Applying an intersectional method of 
investigation allows us to link discrimination to factors belonging 
to the social environment, such as homelessness, which are not 
directly covered by most discrimination law sources.12  A ground 
of discrimination must then be understood as a channel “to 
describe different power relationships.”13 
Canadian Courts have proved to be a vanguard in using an 
intersectional approach to discrimination.  Egan v. Canada,14 a 
landmark case decided by the Canadian Supreme Court, 
recognized sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under Article 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.15  Judge L’Heureux-Dubé wrote in the majority 
opinion that: 
 
As this Court has frequently acknowledged, the 
essence of discrimination is its impact, not its 
intention. . . . We will never address the problem of 
discrimination completely, or ferret it out in all its 
forms, if we continue to focus on abstract categories 
and generalizations rather than on specific effects. . . 
. By looking at the grounds for the distinction 
instead of at the impact of the distinction on 
particular groups, we risk undertaking an analysis 
that is distanced and desensitized from real people’s 
real experiences. . . . More often than not, 
disadvantage arises from the way in which society 
treats particular individuals, rather than from any 
characteristic inherent in those individuals.16 
 
 
 10.  ONT. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, AN INTERSECTIONAL APPROACH TO DISCRIMINATION: 
ADDRESSING MULTIPLE GROUNDS IN HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS 2 (2001).  
 11.  Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 12.  See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012); see 
also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.); see also Equality Act 2010, c. 
15 (Eng.).  
 13.  Fredman, supra note 5, at 8. 
 14.  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.). 
 15.  Id. at 522. 
 16.  Id. at 551-52. (emphasis added). 
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The aforementioned case was not the only one where the 
topic of intersectionality was touched upon by Canadian Courts.  
In Law v. Canada,17 the Supreme Court stated that “there is no 
reason in principle . . . why a discrimination claim positing an 
intersection of grounds cannot be understood as analogous to, or 
as a synthesis of, the grounds listed in s. 15(1).”18  In Corbiére v. 
Canada,19 Judge L’Heurex-Dubé stated that, when the Court’s 
inquiry is to recognize whether a ground of discrimination can be 
considered as analogous or not, stereotyping, prejudice or denials 
of human dignity and worth need to be considered.20  She affirmed 
that the Court should recognize “that personal characteristics 
may overlap or intersect” and that grounds of discrimination 
should “reflect changing social phenomena or new or different 
forms of stereotyping or prejudice.”21 
To conclude, the intersectional method is the best fit for this 
investigation because it requires an analysis of contextual factors.  
A contextual analysis entails: “[E]xamining the discriminatory 
stereotypes; the purpose of the legislation, regulation or policy; 
[and] the nature of and/or situation of the individual at issue, and 
the social, political and legal history of the person’s treatment in 
society.”22  These elements will be tackled in the following 
paragraphs. 
II. HOMELESSNESS AS A GROUND OF DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Complexity of Homelessness 
Homelessness is a multifaceted concept and number of 
difficulties might arise when it is approached.  It is hard to refer 
to homelessness as a ground of discrimination if we consider a 
traditional, single ground approach to discrimination as the one 
used today by most legislators and national/international 
courts.23  In his book, A Theory of Discrimination Law, Tarunabh 
 
 17.  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.). (The case dealt with pension benefits and 
discrimination on the ground of age.) 
 18.  Id. at 555. (In Canadian equality case law, the concept of analogous grounds 
of discrimination has been used to extend protection against discrimination based on 
grounds that are not enumerated in the Canadian Charter.) 
 19.   [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (Can.) (This case dealt with discrimination experienced 
by Aboriginal people who did not live in a reserve.) 
 20.  Id. at 216. 
 21.  Id. at 253. 
 22.  ONT. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 10, at 28.  
 23.  “There’s no explicit mention [to multiple discrimination] in the legislation of 
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Keithan builds the architecture of discrimination law on three 
elements: protectorate, duty bearers, and duties.24  The 
protectorate is a group of individuals that is classified as such by 
specific characteristics called grounds.25  The protected ground, in 
order to be called so, must possess two requirements, the first 
being that the ground must be a personal characteristic that 
classifies “persons into groups with a significant advantage gap 
between them” and, second, “[i]t must be either immutable or it 
must constitute a fundamental choice.”26 
Definitions of homelessness vary between different countries 
and scholars or policy makers.  In a strict and rather simplistic 
interpretation, homelessness can be described as “a lack, or 
inadequacy, of housing arrangements” but, in fact, it is a much 
more complex concept.27  If we take into consideration the so-
called personal ground condition,28 it can be argued that this 
condition is missing if we look at the diversity of individuals that 
lack an adequate housing arrangement.  Indeed, in the opinion of 
Tanudjaja v. Canada,29 Judge Lederer of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice dismissed an application that claimed a violation 
of Section 7 and Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms caused by changes in legislation which gave rise to an 
increase in inadequate housing and homelessness.30  One 
 
21 of the [European] States [Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Norway] covered. . . . National experts report very little case law, 
whether or not States have an explicit provision for multiple discrimination. Indeed, 
out of the countries with explicit provision, only Austria, Germany and Italy point to 
cases before the courts where there is even a suggestion of multiple discrimination. 
Where there have been cases, the full implications of intersectionality are rarely 
developed.” FREDMAN, supra note 5, at 53.  
 24.  TARUBABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 50 (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 50. 
 27.  Marie-Eve Sylvestere & Céline Bellot, Challenging Discriminatory and 
Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada, in ADVANCING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN 
CANADA, (Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter ed., Irwin Law, 2014). 
 28.  KHAITAN, supra note 21, at 29. 
 29.  [2013], 116 O.R. 3d 574, 2 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
 30.  Id. at 2, 51; see Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §§ 7, 15 (U.K.). 
(“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. . . 
. Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age 
or mental or physical disability.”) 
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individual reported that Judge Lederer argued that homelessness 
could not be considered as an analogous ground of discrimination 
because it lacked definability and therefore it was not fit to 
indicate who belonged to that specific group and who did not.31  
Hence, if we look at a traditional ground of discrimination, such 
as race, it can be argued that it lacks definability as well as there 
are no specific requirements (such as a specific level of dark skin 
or an ethnic background) set in order to qualify as a member of 
the group.32  Therefore, the heterogeneity of homelessness cannot 
be considered an obstacle to consider it as a protected ground.  
Homelessness can be rightly addressed only if it is conceived as a 
multi-dimensional concept: “[R]ights violation, social exclusion 
and inclusion, poverty and discrimination” must be included.33  
The Canadian Observatory on Homelessness provided that: 
 
Homelessness describes the situation of an 
individual or family without stable, permanent, 
appropriate housing, or the immediate prospect, 
means and ability of acquiring it. It is the result of 
systemic or societal barriers, a lack of affordable and 
appropriate housing, the individual/household’s 
financial, mental, cognitive, behavioral [sic] or 
physical challenges, and/or racism and 
discrimination.34 
 
Homelessness cannot be defined in terms of immutability, 
either.  Immutability has always played an important role in 
antidiscrimination.35  For instance, it has been one of the key 
points of the US Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on equal 
protection.36  But it does not work with the concept of 
homelessness, which is “a rather fluid experience.”37  It is not an 
 
 31.  Joshua Sealy-Harrington, Should Homelessness be an Analogous Ground? 
Clarifying the Multi Variable Approach to Section 15 of the Charter, ABLAWG: THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY FACULTY OF LAW BLOG, 1, (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Blog_JSH_Tanudjaja_v_AG_ 
December-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q7G-RCE6]. 
 32.  Id. at 4. 
 33.  Sylvester & Bellot, supra note 27, at 5. 
 34.  Stephen Gaetz, et. al., Canadian Definition of Homelessness, CANADIAN 
OBSERVATORY ON HOMELESSNESS, 1, (2012), http://homelesshub.ca 
/sites/default/files/COHhomelessdefinition.pdf. 
 35.  Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L. J. 2, 2 (2015). 
 36.  Id. at 4-5. 
 37.  Stephen Gaetz et. al., supra note 34, at 1. 
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innate characteristic of the individual and the nature of the 
housing condition or the duration of the homelessness itself may 
vary in time.38  It includes different physical living conditions 
which can be divided into different typologies: (1) “unsheltered” is 
described as people who are absolutely homeless and, therefore, 
are living in the street or in a place that is not adequate for human 
habitation; (2) “emergency sheltered” are people who live in 
shelters that could be either temporary, occasional, or permanent; 
(3) “provisionally accommodated” are people who are staying in 
an accommodation that is transitional and temporary (including 
prisons or mental health institutions); (4) “at risk of 
homelessness” are people who are not homeless yet (strictly 
speaking), but who are living in a precarious economic housing 
situation or in an inadequate one because it lacks safety, is 
unaffordable, or overcrowded.39 
B. The Intersectionality of Homelessness: Stereotypes, 
Stigma and Social Profiling 
Having addressed the difficulties or critics that might arise 
when dealing with homelessness as a ground of discrimination in 
a traditional approach, it is now possible to look at homelessness 
from an intersectional point of view.  Intersectionality has been 
defined as an “intersectional oppression [that] arises out of the 
combination of various oppressions which, together, produce 
something unique and distinct from any one form of 
discrimination standing alone.”40  What homeless people have in 
common is that they have all been subjected to a unique kind of 
discrimination characterized by social exclusion, social profiling, 
historic stigma, and prejudice.  They have always been placed last 
in the entire social, political, and legal structure of our society.  
The focus of courts and tribunals when they intervene, should be 
the effects that provision has on a group of individuals based upon 
the position of that group in our society. 
Another problem related to homelessness and 
intersectionality is that “marginalized groups are 
disproportionately represented in the homeless population, and 
are therefore, disproportionately targeted by the ordinances that 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Mary Eaton, Patently Confused: Complex Inequality and Canada v. Mossop, 
1 REV. CONST. STUD. 203, 229 (1994). 
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criminalize homelessness.”41  In 2014, there was approximately 
3.5 million people who were homeless in the United States.42  Of 
those 3.5 million homeless people, 42% of them were African 
American, despite being only 12% of the population, and 20% of 
them were Hispanic, who make up 12% of the overall 
population.43  Additionally, 20-40% of the homeless population 
identify as LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) 
compared to only making up 5-10% of the overall population.44  
Approximately 30% of the homeless population has a mental 
disability.45  This phenomenon of overrepresentation does not 
apply only to the United States.  If we look at mental health, for 
example, around 30% of the homeless population in Europe 
(150,000 people) also experiences severe, chronic mental illness.46 
In a psychiatric study conducted in Toronto (home to the 
largest homeless population in Canada), researchers found how 
discrimination according to homelessness was perceived as 
qualitatively different than discrimination on the ground of 
race.47  The stigma of being homeless causes deep shame because 
homelessness is “situational and subject to at least some potential 
for change, and . . . can be hard to hide from others.”48  When the 
stigmatized identity is perceived by the public as “controllable, 
group-based discrimination has a more harmful effect on well-
being than discrimination directed against those with an 
uncontrollable stigma (such as race or gender) . . . Because 
housing status is perceived as somewhat under an individual’s 
control . . . the homeless are often considered to be responsible for 
their lack of adequate housing . . . .”49 
The result of the overrepresentation of marginalized group in 
 
 41.  Kaya Lurie & Breanne Schuster, Discrimination At The Margins: The 
Intersectionality Of Homelessness & Other Marginalized Group, SEATTLE U. SCH. OF 
L.: HOMELESS RTS. ADVOC. PROJECT, iv, (May 2015).  
 42.  Id. at iv (citing RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY (2014)). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at v. 
 45.  Id. at vi. 
 46.  Access to Services by People with Severe Mental Health Problems Who Are 
Homeless, MENTAL HEALTH EUR., 1, (Sept. 2013). 
 47.  Suzanne Zerger et al., Differential Experiences of Discrimination Among 
Ethnoracially Diverse Persons Experiencing Mental Illness and Homelessness, 14 BMC 
PSYCHIATRY 353, 362 (2014). 
 48.  Id. at 366. 
 49.  Melissa Johnstone et al., Discrimination and Well-being Amongst the 
Homeless: The Role of Multiple Group Membership, 6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 2 
(2015). 
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the homeless population is a unique kind of discrimination that 
occurs as a consequence of the intersection of different types of 
disadvantages.50  It is unique because not only is it perceived as 
legitimate but also because it is conducted by a much higher 
number of individuals.51  This makes the homeless population 
different from every other minority group.52  Homeless are 
discriminated from their own friends and family as well as from 
the mainstream.53 
Punitive responses to homelessness have always been based 
on negative stereotyping and prejudices.54  It is possible to 
identify three distinct sets of beliefs, which are wrongly connected 
to homelessness.55  The first is the “moral depravation” belief, 
which portrays homeless individuals as morally inferior, lazy, and 
dishonest individuals.56  The second being the “choice” belief, 
where homeless individuals are blamed for their own 
misfortune.57  Thirdly, the “criminality” belief, which assumes 
that the homeless are “criminals or potential serious offenders 
needing to be repressed or confined.”58  The issue of freedom of 
choice and the question of immutability has been partially 
addressed in the previous section of this essay but it can be 
analyzed further.  In general, “choices and options are extremely 
limited” for the homeless.59  Life cannot be described as a 
dichotomy between choice and constraint since this choice does 
not reference how our actions are embedded in social structures 
and interactions.60  The criminalization of homeless conduct led 
by governments in order to punish them and, thus, encouraging 
them to change their condition results only in further exclusion, 
rather than in deterrence.61  The idea of homelessness by choice 
is more a myth than a proven fact.62 
Social profiling is generated by an action taken against an 
individual based on the fact that, according to the individual’s 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 3. 
 54.  Sylvestere & Bellot, supra note 27, at 1. 
 55.  Id. at 2. 
 56.  Id. at 1-2. 
 57.  Id. at 2. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 23. 
 60.  Id. at 22. 
 61.  Id. at 23. 
 62.  Id. at 12. 
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appearance, they are perceived to be a member of an identified 
group of people.63  Homeless are victims of social profiling based 
on their neglected appearance, on the status of their personal 
hygiene, or on their clothing.64  Social profiling can be seen in 
broad interpretations of regulations resulting in criminalization 
of homelessness.65 
In conclusion, due to stigma, stereotypes, and social profiling, 
homelessness involves much more than the absence of housing.66  
It becomes an “all-encompassing social identity or social label for 
individuals” that defines them in a way that is “socially 
constructed and difficult to change” as in “every part of society 
perceives and treats a person differently once they [are] 
homeless.”67 
C. Quality of Life and Anti-Homelessness Ordinances 
At this point of the analysis, it is possible to apply 
intersectionality as a general theory of identity in order to 
examine the underlying structures of inequality that emerge from 
the criminalization of homelessness. One can distinguish 
different types of regulations that affect homelessness: anti-
homelessness ordinances and quality of life ordinances. 
First, anti-homeless ordinances are laws that prohibit 
activities such as standing, sitting and resting in public spaces 
and other daytime activities.68  Such activities include sleeping, 
camping and lodging (including in vehicles and other nighttime 
activities), begging, panhandling, and food sharing.69  Generally 
the regulation of public places has increased.  Authorities in 
Canada prohibit antisocial behavior in public places, including 
parks, sidewalks, and subway stations.70  In a survey conducted 
by the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty, of 187 
cities in the United States, 34% of those cities prohibited camping 
in public, 57% prohibited camping in particular public spaces, 
27% of these cities prohibits sleeping in particular public places, 
 
 63.  Id. at 18. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 24. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Chris Herring & Dilara Yarbrough et al., Punishing the Poorest: How the 
Criminalization of Homelessness Perpetuates Poverty in San Francisco, COALITION ON 
HOMELESSNESS 6 (2015). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Sylvestere & Bellot, supra note 27, at 13. 
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76% prohibits begging in particular public spaces, 53% prohibits 
“sitting or lying down in particular public places” and so on.71 
Similar ordinances can also be found throughout Europe.72  
These regulations are essentially criminalizing life-sustaining 
conduct of the homeless population.73  Homeless people lack 
private spaces, they must use public spaces to meet their most 
basic needs.74  Public spaces are the only spaces the homeless 
population can use, hence, they are directly being discriminated 
against.75  Therefore, these regulations are highly ineffective 
because they only result in creating more obstacles for the 
homeless population.76  Due to the criminalization of their 
survival strategies, not because of a higher display of criminal 
behaviors, homeless people are over-represented in prison 
population.77 
Numerous examples of laws prohibiting activities of people 
experiencing homelessness, can be found throughout a variety of 
legal systems.  In 1999, the province of Ontario (Canada) adopted 
the Safe Streets Act, 1999.78  This Act prohibits solicitation in an 
“aggressive manner” and of a “captive audience.”79  Solicitation is 
defined as the action of “request[ing], in person, the immediate 
provision of money or another thing of value, regardless of 
whether consideration is offered or provided in return, using the 
spoken, written or printed word, a gesture or other means.”80  In 
England, the Vagrancy Act of 1824 punishes “[e]very person 
wandering abroad, or placing himself or herself in any public 
place, street, highway, court, or passage, to beg or gather alms.”81  
Further, it prohibits “wandering abroad and lodging in any barn 
or outhouse, or in any deserted or unoccupied building, or in the 
open air, or under a tent, or in any cart or wagon, not having any 
 
 71.  Tristia Bauman et. al., No Safe Place: The Criminalization of Homelessness 
in U.S. Cities, NATIONAL L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY (July 16, 2014), 7-8. 
 72.  Guillem Fernández Evangelista, Mean Streets: A Report on the 
Criminalisation of Homelessness in Europe, EUR. FED’N OF NAT’L ORG. WORKING WITH 
THE HOMELESS, (June 2013), 15-16. 
 73.  Sylvestere & Bellot, supra note 27, at 14. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Evangelista, supra note 72, at 10. 
 77.  Id. at 66. 
 78.  Safe Streets Act, 1999, R.S.O. 1999, c. P. 8 (Can.). 
 79.  Id. at c. P. 8, art 2-3. 
 80.  Id. at c. P. 8, art 1. 
 81.  An Act for the Punishment of Iide and Disorderly Persons, Rogues, and 
Vagabonds 1824, 15 & 16 Geo. IV, c. 83, § 3 (Eng.). 
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visible means of subsistence and not giving a good account of 
himself or herself.” 82 
If we look at the audience affected by this kind of law, it is 
evident that it is the homeless population.  The only purpose of 
this law is to ban a set of actions that are carried out solely by the 
homeless.83  The rationale behind it is termed the “broken-
windows” theory.84  This term refers to a theory in criminology 
that implies an absence of appropriate legal response to the initial 
unlawfulness might be interpreted as if that neighborhood 
tolerates crime.85  It argues that in order to prevent vandalism, 
actions should be taken against the smallest example of 
disorder.86  In addition, homeless people are seen as potential 
criminals who should be removed from public spaces to prevent 
more serious crime in local communities.87  Measures directed at 
controlling public space are often created to make homelessness 
invisible.88  Often the prohibition of homeless conduct is framed 
in terms of public order and, thus, it is taken away from the area 
of competence of “positive” social policies.89 
Further, quality of life ordinances are those that regulate 
“low-level non-violent crimes of activities frequently considered 
nuisances and are mainly intended to regulate ‘uncivil behavior’ 
and ‘public disorder’ in public spaces.”90  The activities, which are 
listed in these kind of ordinances, are characterized by the fact 
that they would not be criminalized if they “occur[red] on private 
property or within one’s home.”91  They include restrictions on 
drinking in public, littering, climbing trees, dogs not leashed and 
so on.92  The problem of this set of ordinances is that they result 
in direct discrimination of those who do not have a home.93  Such 
a facially neutral provision results in discrimination when 
 
 82.  Id. at § 4.  
 83.  Sylvestere & Bellot, supra note 27, at 11-13. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATL. MONTHLY, 29, 31 (Mar. 1982). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Sylvestere & Bellot, supra note 27, at 11. 
 88.  Id. at 13. 
 89.  Antonio Tosi, Homelessness and the Control of Public Space – Criminalising 
the Poor?, 1 EUR. J. OF HOMELESSNESS 225, 229 (2007). 
 90.  Herring & Yarbrough, et al., supra note 68, at 6. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
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enforced.94 
III. CONCLUSION 
This analysis started with providing a new kind of approach 
to homelessness.  What was argued is that it is possible to 
consider homelessness as a ground of discrimination if seen in an 
intersectional perspective.  The fundamental element of 
intersectionality is power: it describes the specific and distinctive 
experience of those who are subjected to historical disadvantages 
because of society’s reaction to them.95  The different examples of 
regulations analyzed proved the fact that the homeless are 
subjected to systemic discrimination.  Homelessness should not 
be defined only in terms of lack of housing, rather, it is the stigma 
of being homeless is what makes their condition unique. 
Canada may be considered a leading example in the field of 
intersectionality.96  Canadian courts have applied the analogous 
approach in order to expand the number of protected grounds 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms.97  Section 
15(1) of the Charter states: “[e]very individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”98  This 
article has been further interpreted by the courts in order to 
extend its application to grounds that are not expressly 
mentioned, the so-called analogous grounds or “insular 
minorities.”99  The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in the 
Andrews decision that whether or not the protection granted by 
Section 15 could also be of a specific group is a: 
 
[D]etermination which is not to be made only in the 
context of the law which is subject to challenge but 
rather in the context of the place of the group in the 
entire social, political and legal fabric of our society. 
 
 94.  See id. 
 95.  See FREDMAN, supra note 5; see generally Crenshaw, supra note 1. 
 96.  See generally Egan at 514.   
 97.  See The Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 
(Can.). 
 98.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 99.  Andrews, 1 S.C.R. at 3-4.  
GIANNINIFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/18  2:59 PM 
2017] HOMELESSNESS 41 
While legislatures must inevitably draw distinctions 
among the governed, such distinctions should not 
bring about or re-inforce the disadvantage of certain 
groups and individuals by denying them the rights 
freely accorded to others.100 
 
Since that decision, the Court has stretched the analogous 
grounds approach to include other grounds such as sexual 
orientation, marital status, and so on.101  As emphasized at the 
beginning of this essay, the Court relied on the historical 
disadvantage suffered by members of this group.102  The question 
whether homelessness or social condition should be considered as 
an analogous ground has not been settled yet by the Canadian 
Supreme Court. 
If we look at sources of international law, Articles 2 and 26 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights impose 
that all persons should enjoy equal protection of the laws 
regardless of social origin, property or other status.103  Article 1 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights bans discrimination 
on the basis of “social origin . . . or any other social condition.”104 
Introducing homelessness or, more in general, social 
condition as a prohibited ground of discrimination “provides the 
potential of better reflecting the realities of discrimination in that 
it, in many ways, offers a means for recognizing the way social 
and economic disadvantage intersects with other grounds of 
discrimination . . . .”105 Failing to recognize this kind of 
intersectional discrimination results in countless individuals 
falling through the cracks of anti-discrimination law. The 
discrimination that results from enforcement of quality of life and 
anti-homeless regulations is an example of this.  The approach to 
discrimination used by courts and legislators should be an 
inclusive one, rather than the opposite.  Social condition can 
intersect with numerous other relevant characteristics, such as 
race, gender, or ethnic origin and, therefore, result in aggravated 
 
 100.  Andrews [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 3. 
 101.  Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 562 (Can.); Corbiére v. Canada, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 203, 252 (Can.).  
 102.  See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 521 (Can.). 
 103.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 1976 
U.N.T.S. 172, 173-79.  
 104.  American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” Costa 
Rica-U.S., Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36. 
 105.  WAYNE MACKAY & NATASHA KIM, ADDING SOCIAL CONDITION TO THE 
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHT ACT 76 (2009). 
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discrimination.  These people might seek and obtain justice on the 
base of a recognized ground.  However, what is even more 
endangered is the position of those who do not fall into any of 
these categories and are being discriminated only because of their 
socio-economic status.  Deprived of shelter and of the basic pillars 
of modern life, those without additional classifications are left 
without any kind of remedy to their plight. 
 
